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INTRODUCTION 
The two most recent federal statutes passed pursuant to Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power are the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) and the Shepard-Byrd Hate Crimes Act 
of 2009. While the Thirteenth Amendment basis of the TVPA has never 
been questioned in court, the constitutionality of the Shepard-Byrd Act 
has been challenged (albeit unsuccessfully) in a series of recent cases. 
This Essay will consider this disparity and suggest that it tells us some-
thing about the parameters of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power. In particular, it suggests that congressional power is at its apex 
when the conduct regulated—like human trafficking—has a close nexus 
                                                 
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; J.D., New York University 
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to actual conditions of slavery or involuntary servitude. When the con-
duct regulated is a step removed from the Amendment’s textual prohibi-
tions, as racial hate crimes are, that conceptual space permits greater de-
bate about the validity of Congress’s action. 
This Essay will begin by examining the text and legislative history 
of each act, paying particular attention to the evidence Congress amassed 
connecting the legislation to the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. It will then contrast litigation filed in response to the TVPA, which 
has not raised Thirteenth Amendment issues, with the constitutional cri-
tiques made in recent challenges to the Shepard-Byrd Act. Those chal-
lenges have been unsuccessful to date, which is unsurprising given the 
deferential standards currently governing Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement legislation.1 However, the arguments made in those challenges 
are tied to a strain of Supreme Court precedent and legal scholarship that 
calls for more thorough legislative fact-finding and a tighter link between 
regulated conduct and substantive constitutional violations. Indeed, judg-
es from two federal courts of appeals have acknowledged that it may be 
time for the Supreme Court to reexamine the scope of Congress’s power 
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.2 
From this perspective, the Shepard-Byrd Act’s prohibition on racial 
hate crimes may be on shakier constitutional footing than the TVPA. At 
first glance, this seems ironic given that racial minorities were the origi-
nal intended beneficiaries of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections. 
However, it ultimately may mean that at this point in our nation’s histo-
ry, with chattel slavery solidly abolished, the Thirteenth Amendment is 
best understood as a provision that speaks to labor rights and conditions. 
If so, Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power today is 
more appropriately focused on ensuring free labor than ameliorating ra-
cial discrimination. 
                                                 
 1. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (permitting Congress “rational-
ly to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery” and then legislate to eradicate 
them). 
 2. See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 509 (5th Cir. 2014) (Elrod, J., specially concur-
ring) (“[T]here is a growing tension between the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the scope of 
Congress’s powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decisions regarding the other Reconstruction Amendments and the Commerce Clause.”); United 
States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t will be up to the Supreme Court to 
choose whether to extend its more recent federalism cases to the Thirteenth Amendment.”). 
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I. THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000 
A. The Legislative Record 
Congress passed the TVPA “to combat trafficking in persons, a 
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly 
women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffick-
ers, and to protect their victims.”3 To that end, the statute enhances crim-
inal penalties for traffickers, provides protection and assistance programs 
for victims, and creates a variety of mechanisms to prevent trafficking. 
In passing the bill, Congress alluded to both its power to regulate 
interstate commerce as well as its power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Congress issued findings that “[t]rafficking in persons sub-
stantially affects interstate and foreign commerce,”4 and that human traf-
ficking is “a modern form of slavery” and “the largest manifestation of 
slavery today.”5 Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
slavery and involuntary servitude, Congress declared that “[c]urrent 
practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children are 
similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was 
founded.”6 
Congress gathered extensive evidence regarding the causes and ef-
fects of human trafficking. At the heart of the record was evidence that 
workers are trafficked under conditions akin to the slave trade and held 
in conditions akin to slavery. As Senator Sam Brownback stated: 
International sex trafficking is the new slavery. It includes all the 
elements associated with slavery, including being abducted from 
your family and home, taken to a strange country where you do not 
speak the language, losing your identity and freedom, being forced 
to work against your will with no pay, being beaten and raped, hav-
ing no defense against the one who rules you, and eventually dying 
early because of this criminal misuse.7 
A State Department official testified, similarly, that “[a] trafficking 
scheme involves a continuum of recruitment, abduction, transport, har-
boring, transfer, sale or receipt of persons through various types of coer-
                                                 
 3. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 
114 Stat. 1464, 1466. Division A of this bill is denominated the “Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
of 2000.”  See id. § 101. 
 4. Id. § 102(b)(12). 
 5. Id. § 102(b)(1). 
 6. Id. § 102(b)(22). 
 7. International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near 
E. and S. Asian Affairs, 106th Cong. 72 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback). 
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cion, force, fraud or deception for the purpose of placing persons in sit-
uations of slavery or slavery-like conditions, servitude, forced labor or 
services.”8 And, as one witness put it, “[w]hile we discuss this problem 
using such terms as ‘trafficking’ and ‘forced labor,’ we should make no 
mistake about it: we are talking about slavery, slavery in its modern man-
ifestations.”9 
Congress also heard evidence regarding the vast scope of the prob-
lem of trafficking: “At least 700,000 persons annually, primarily women 
and children, are trafficked within or across international borders. Ap-
proximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United 
States each year.”10 One witness related stories of debt bondage and sex-
ual slavery in which women are forced to work off tens of thousands of 
dollars in debt to traffickers by servicing dozens of men a day. The wit-
ness concluded that “[t]hese numbers and the accompanying accounts 
illustrate that trafficking of women and children for purposes of prostitu-
tion has become a contemporary form of slavery. The numbers may soon 
be on par with the African slave trade of the 1700s.”11 
This testimony and these statistics lend great support to Congress’s 
ultimate conclusion that human trafficking is “a modern form of slav-
ery”12 redressable under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
B. Constitutional Challenges 
Convictions under the TVPA have been routinely upheld against 
constitutional challenge. The most common challenge has been to 
18 U.S.C. § 1591, a provision of the TVPA that imposes punishment on 
anyone who “knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce” 
entices a minor to engage in a commercial sex act.13 Many have been 
convicted under that provision based on conduct that was entirely intra-
state, and they have questioned whether Congress had the power to ad-
dress such conduct. This portion of the TVPA has routinely withstood 
                                                 
 8. Id. at 11 (statement of the Hon. Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs). 
 9. Id. at 76 (statement of William R. Yeomans, Chief of Staff, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 3 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). 
 11. International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near 
E. and S. Asian Affairs, 106th Cong. 34 (statement of Dr. Laura J. Lederer, Director, The Protection 
Project, The Kennedy School of Gov’t at Harvard University). 
 12. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 102(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1) (2012)). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-115 approved 12-28-2015). 
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such challenges14 on the authority of Gonzales v. Raich, in which the Su-
preme Court held that Congress’s commerce power permits it to “regu-
late purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activi-
ties’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”15 
The TVPA, however, has never been challenged as beyond Con-
gress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment,16 even though one 
commentator has noted that it might be susceptible to challenge on that 
basis.17 One portion of the TVPA, enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 1584, prohibits 
labor that is forced by “means of serious harm or threats of serious 
harm.”18 Serious harm is defined to include 
any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychologi-
cal, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under 
all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of 
the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or 
to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring 
that harm.19 
This definition was included to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Kozminski, which had held that statutory prohibitions on 
“involuntary servitude” barred only labor coerced through physical force 
or threats of legal compulsion.20 The Kozminski Court stated that such 
prohibitions should be read in line with the Court’s interpretations of the 
Thirteenth Amendment itself and concluded that the intent of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, buttressed by the Court’s own precedents, was to 
prohibit servitude “enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or 
legal coercion.”21 In passing the TVPA, however, Congress determined 
that a substantial number of trafficked laborers were in fact subject to 
                                                 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179–80 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding § 1591 
constitutional as applied to solely intrastate activities); see also United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 
333 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which proscribes the use of interstate commerce 
for acts of sex trafficking, was easily within Congress’s commerce power). 
 15. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
 16. See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Shift-
ing Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2012). In one case, the defendant 
challenged a portion of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (prohibiting forced labor), under the Commerce 
Clause, and a district court held that this provision was constitutional under Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power. See United States v. Garcia, No. 02–CR–110S–01, 2003 WL 
22938040 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003). 
 17. See Rebecca Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 255, 309 (2010). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
 19. Id. § 1589(c)(2). 
 20. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944–45 (1988). 
 21. Id. at 944. 
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psychological coercion and, therefore, a statutory ban on labor forced 
through psychological harm would help to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude.22 
Despite the Kozminski Court’s disclaimers that its task was one of 
statutory interpretation23 and that it was “draw[ing] no conclu-
sions . . . about the potential scope of the Thirteenth Amendment,”24 it is 
at least arguable that the Court’s ruling was “based both on statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.”25 Thus, Rebecca Zietlow has pointed out 
that “[t]o the extent that Kozminski is a constitutional decision, the Court, 
influenced by [City of Boerne v. Flores26], might find the TVPA to be 
unconstitutionally inconsistent with its own interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.”27 
Several defendants have challenged their convictions under § 1584 
arguing that Kozminski provides the relevant definition of involuntary 
servitude. The federal courts have routinely rejected these arguments, 
holding that the TVPA supersedes Kozminski.28 No court has ever con-
fronted—and presumably no litigant has ever raised—the issue of 
whether Congress exceeded its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power by seeking to overrule Kozminski. While this argument may not 
have ultimately prevailed, it seems notable that no portion of the TVPA, 
including its expanded statutory definition of “involuntary servitude,” 
has ever been challenged on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. 
II. THE MATTHEW SHEPARD AND JAMES L. BYRD, JR. HATE CRIMES 
PREVENTION ACT OF 2009 
A. The Legislative Record 
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act of 2009 makes it a federal crime to willfully injure or attempt to in-
jure any person “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, 
                                                 
 22. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 102(b)(13), 114 Stat. 1464. 
 23. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934, 940, 941. 
 24. Id. at 944; see also id. at 952 (noting the possibility of “change by Congress” to its hold-
ing). 
 25. See Zietlow, supra note 17, at 309–10. 
 26. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 27. See Zietlow, supra note 17, at 310. 
 28. See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 712, 714 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding § 1584 
covers nonviolent psychological coercion and was designed to supersede Kozminski); United States 
v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 150, 156–57 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing § 1584 was designed to super-
sede Kozminski). 
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or national origin of [that] person.”29 The Shepard-Byrd Act is not the 
first federal law that prohibits racially motivated crimes, but it is the first 
in which Congress relied exclusively on its Thirteenth Amendment pow-
er in passing the bill.30 In its findings at the beginning of the Act, Con-
gress specifically justified this provision as an exercise of its power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Congress found, first, that “[s]lavery 
and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the adop-
tion of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
through widespread public and private violence directed at persons be-
cause of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ances-
try.”31 Next, Congress asserted that “eliminating racially motivated vio-
lence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the 
badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.”32 
This finding echoed the language of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
in which the Supreme Court held that “Congress has the power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and 
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination 
into effective legislation.”33 In that case, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1982, which was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was valid Thir-
teenth Amendment enforcement legislation.34 Section 1982 gives “[a]ll 
citizens of the United States . . . the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”35 In Jones, the Court 
endorsed as rational Congress’s determination that private racial discrim-
ination in the sale and rental of property was a badge and incident of 
slavery: “At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to 
secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy 
                                                 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012). The Shepard-Byrd Act also criminalizes hate crimes based 
on gender, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity, but a conviction under those provisions 
requires proof that the crime generally affected interstate or foreign commerce.  Id. § 249(a)(2)(B). 
Thus, Congress asserted jurisdiction over these types of hate crimes through its power over interstate 
commerce. 
 30. Another federal hate crimes statute requires proof that the crime was motivated not only by 
animus but also because of the victim’s participation in one of six enumerated federally protected 
activities. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(A)–(F) (2012). The Shepard-Byrd Act simply requires 
animus without any other jurisdictional element. 
 31. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111–84, 
div. E., § 4702(7), 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
 34. Id. at 413.  
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
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whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man 
can live.”36 
Three years later, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court held that 
“Congress was wholly within its powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in creating” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), “a statutory cause of ac-
tion for Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, ra-
cially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic 
rights that the law secures to all free men.”37 The conduct at issue in 
Griffin was racially motivated violence against African Americans who 
were (mistakenly) believed to be civil rights workers. Thus, the Court’s 
holding implicitly indicates that Congress could rationally regard racially 
motivated violence as a badge or incident of slavery, at least where such 
violence is pursued with the intent to deprive the victim of a constitu-
tional right. 
Although the Shepard-Byrd Act was passed in 2009, earlier ver-
sions containing the same racial hate crimes provision were proposed 
starting in 1997 and debated for more than a decade.38 The primary focus 
of those debates was the need for federal legislation regarding non-race-
based hate crimes, especially those based on sexual orientation and gen-
der identity. Still, there was meaningful attention paid to the issue of ra-
cial hate crimes. Committee reports and witness statements uniformly 
pointed to the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power as the constitu-
tional basis for the racial hate crimes provision of the bill.39 Indeed, wit-
nesses presented Congress with a capacious understanding of its Thir-
teenth Amendment enforcement power, testifying that all “racial discrim-
ination directed at African-Americans is a badge or incident of slav-
ery.”40 
                                                 
 36. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443. 
 37. 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). 
 38. See, e.g., S. 909, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1913, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1105, 110th 
Cong. (2007); H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2662, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4204, 108th 
Cong. (2004); H.R. 74, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 77, 106th Cong. 
(1999); S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 39. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-147, at 14 (2002) (“The 13th Amendment broadly authorizes 
Congress to regulate acts of violence committed on the basis of race, color, religion, or national 
origin and therefore provides an ample constitutional basis for the provision of the Hate Crimes Act 
that addresses crimes falling within these categories.”). 
 40. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1529 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1998) (statement of Professor Lawrence Alexander); see also id. 
at 45 (statement of Professor Chai R. Feldblum) (stating that Congress has power to “impose liability 
on private persons under section 2 of the 13th Amendment for racially-based discrimination”). 
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Congress’s ultimate conclusion of law—that racially motivated vio-
lence is a badge or incident of slavery—had wide-ranging support. In 
2000, the Justice Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs issued a 
Statement of Administration Position that stated: “[T]he prohibition of 
racially motivated violence would be a permissible exercise of Congress’ 
broad authority to enforce the 13th amendment.”41 This evaluation was 
reviewed and endorsed by the Justice Department in 2009,42 and was re-
lied on by the House and Senate Reports on the bill.43 Expert testimony 
supported this view as well.44 
Congress compiled a factual record with respect to the frequency 
and effects of hate crimes, although that record did not draw specific 
links between racial hate crimes and the substantive guarantees of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. A 2009 House Report cited the most current da-
ta then available, which showed that in 2007, the FBI documented 7,624 
hate crimes, approximately half of which (50.8%) were racially motivat-
ed, 18.4% of which were motivated by religious bias, and 13.2% of 
which were rooted in ethnicity/national origin bias.45 Senator Patrick 
                                                 
 41. S. REP. NO. 107-147, at 17 (2002) (quoting Letter from Assistant Att’y General Robert 
Raben to Sen. Edward Kennedy (June 13, 2000)). President George W. Bush offered a different 
opinion, stating that the racial hate crimes provision “raises constitutional concerns.” OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: 
H.R. 1592 – LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 (2007), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr1592sap-h.pdf. He did 
not consider the Thirteenth Amendment justification for the law, but stated that “the bill would be 
constitutional only if done in the implementation of a power granted to the Federal government, such 
as the power to protect Federal personnel, to regulate interstate commerce, or to enforce equal pro-
tection of the laws.” Id. A group of legal scholars wrote a letter to senators expounding the Thir-
teenth Amendment justification for the bill. See Legal Scholars Contradict White House on Hate 
Crimes Bill, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y (July 31, 2007), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/legal-
scholars-contradict-white-house-on-hate-crimes-bill (reproducing letter in full). 
 42. See Constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 2009 WL 
2810455 (O.L.C 2009). 
 43. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 15 (2009); H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 17 (2007); S. REP. NO. 
107-147, at 17 (2002). 
 44. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1592 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 57 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing 1] (statement of Dean Frederick M. Lawrence) (“Con-
gressional authority to enact the Hate Crimes Prevention Act is found in the Thirteenth Amendment 
and in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”); id. at 59 (“The Thirteenth Amendment is more 
consonant with a positive guarantee of freedom and equal participation in civil society. Violence, 
directed against an individual out of motive of group bias, violates this concept of freedom.”). 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, pt. 1, at 5 (2009). 
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Leahy cited a report from the Southern Poverty Law Center that “found 
that hate groups have increased by 50 percent since 2000.”46 
With respect to the effects of hate crimes, Congress heard evidence 
that such crimes have both individual and societal impacts. Regarding 
individual minority victims, “bias crimes . . . do not produce a greater 
level of psychological damage than those aimed at white victims,”47 but 
such crimes cause “victims to adopt a relatively more defensive behav-
ioral posture than white bias crime victims typically adopt.”48 With re-
spect to societal effects, “failure to address the problem of hate crimes 
can cause a seemingly isolated incident to fester into wide-spread tension 
that can damage the social fabric of the community at large.”49 Moreo-
ver, “bias-motivated acts of violence divide our communities, intimidate 
our most vulnerable citizens, and damage our collective spirit.”50 
There were dissenting voices who urged caution, noting the relative 
lack of judicial guidance on the meaning of the badges and incidents of 
slavery,51 and encouraging more intensive fact-finding as a predicate to 
the exercise of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. For ex-
ample, Representative Randy Forbes of Virginia encouraged Congress 
“to cite evidence, beyond mere claims, that hate crimes against certain 
groups constitute a ‘badge and incidence’ [sic] of slavery. Vague asser-
tions that some hate crimes might be linked to vestiges, badges, or inci-
dents of slavery or segregation would not be enough.”52 Similarly, the 
dissent in a 2007 House Report noted the possibility of future judicial 
scrutiny: 
The [Supreme] Court will want to ensure that, in defining badges 
and incidents of slavery to include hate crimes, Congress has enact-
ed remedial and preventative legislation that seeks to end the true 
effects of slavery, rather than attempting to re-define the term ‘slav-
                                                 
 46. The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing on Serial No. J-111-
83 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing 2] (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
 47. Hearing 1, supra note 44, at 43 (statement of Dean Frederick M. Lawrence). 
 48. Id. 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 9 (2009). 
 50. Hearing 2, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr.). 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 44 (2007) (“The Court, however, has not provided much guid-
ance beyond Jones on what constitutes the ‘badges and incidents of slavery.’”). 
 52. Hearing 1, supra note 44, at 134–35 (statement of J. Randy Forbes, Rep. in Cong. from 
Virginia and Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 110-113, at 44 (2007) (“Only vaguely asserting that some hate crimes might be linked to 
vestiges, badges, or incidents of slavery or segregation would not be enough.”). 
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ery’ or ‘involuntary servitude’ as it has been interpreted by the Su-
preme Court.53 
One of the primary critiques offered by opponents of the bill was 
that Congress’s factual findings were not adequate: “Congress [did not] 
perform the extensive fact-finding required to demonstrate that hate 
crimes are a national problem that requires a Federal solution.”54 Indeed, 
Congress did not have before it any information regarding the enforce-
ment and efficacy of state hate crimes laws.55 As Senator Sessions noted, 
there was no information that “a noticeable number of cases” failed to be 
“prosecuted in State and local governments relating to these kinds of is-
sues that we’re calling hate crimes.”56 Nor were the 2007 statistics re-
garding racial hate crimes cited by supporters dispositive of a need for 
federal legislation: “Statistics for . . . 2002 through 2005 demonstrated a 
steep decline in the number of hate crimes reported.”57 
Thus, Congress’s deliberations leading up to the passage of the 
Shepard-Byrd Act demonstrate that it took a clear and considered posi-
tion on the meaning of the badges and incidents of slavery. Congress also 
compiled a record that evaluated the frequency of racial hate crimes and 
considered the negative effects that flow from such crimes. At the same 
time, it is also true that Congress’s findings did not explicitly consider 
the efficacy of state-level hate crimes laws or whether the effect of ra-
cially motivated violence has been (or even might lead to) violations of 
the substantive guarantees of the Thirteenth Amendment, namely slavery 
or involuntary servitude. Whether the breadth and depth of Congress’s 
inquiry is sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny will depend on the strin-
gency of the review that the Supreme Court would eventually apply. 
B. Constitutional Challenges 
The question of Congress’s power to criminalize race-based hate 
crimes has begun to make its way through the federal courts. Thus far, 
three courts of appeals and one district court have upheld the Shepard-
Byrd Act as valid exercises of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment en-
                                                 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 44 (2007). 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 41 (2009). 
 55. Congress did, however, suggest that federal involvement in hate crimes investigations 
would enhance the number of state prosecutions. One House Report cited the National Church Arson 
Task Force as an example of a beneficial state/federal partnership, which resulted in doubling the 
arson arrest rate and leading to increased numbers of state arson prosecutions. See H.R. REP. NO. 
111-86, pt. 1, at 7–8 (2009). 
 56. Hearing 2, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Jeff Sessions, U.S. Sen. from Alabama). 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 43 (2009). 
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forcement power.58 These decisions are undoubtedly correct under the 
existing framework for analyzing Thirteenth Amendment legislation. 
Section Two of the Amendment gives Congress the power to “enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.”59 The Supreme Court held in the 
Civil Rights Cases that this power permits Congress to pass “all laws 
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in 
the United States.”60 The Court has never defined what are the “badges 
and incidents of slavery.”  However, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the 
Court held that “Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of 
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective 
legislation.”61 Thus, subject only to rationality review, Congress holds 
the power to define the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery, to 
identify conduct as falling within that definition, and to choose appropri-
ate legislative responses to that conduct. 
In the Shepard-Byrd Act, Congress issued a finding that “eliminat-
ing racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to 
the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.”62 Implicit in this statement is the idea that racially 
motivated violence is a badge and incident of slavery, and thus an appro-
priate subject of Thirteenth Amendment legislation. This is certainly a 
rational conclusion, as racially motivated violence “was essential to the 
enslavement of African–Americans and was widely employed after the 
Civil War in an attempt to return African–Americans to a position of de 
facto enslavement.”63 Moreover, it is rational to conclude that using fed-
                                                 
 58. See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hatch, 722 
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Henery, No. 1:14–cr–00088–S–BLW, 2014 WL 
5222741 (D. Idaho Oct. 13, 2014). The Eighth Circuit also upheld the Shepard-Byrd Act in United 
States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2012), but the constitutional challenge in Maybee 
was narrower than in the other cases. In Maybee, the question was whether the Shepard-Byrd Act 
was constitutionally infirm because it did not require that the victim enjoy a public benefit, as other 
hate crimes laws require. See id. 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 60. 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
 61. 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
 62. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111–84, 
div. E., § 4702, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)). 
 63. See Cannon, 750 F.3d at 502. This finding also finds support in the Supreme Court’s own 
case law. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); see also William M. Carter, Jr., Race, 
Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1368 (2007) (arguing that the “paradigmatic” badge and incident of slavery 
involves a case “where the plaintiff is African American and asserts a contemporary injury that 
either existed in the same form during slavery or is closely analogous thereto”). 
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eral criminal law to eliminate such violence is “necessary and proper for 
abolishing” a badge and incident of slavery.64 
Thus, if Jones continues to provide the standard by which courts 
evaluate Thirteenth Amendment legislation, the Shepard-Byrd Act 
should easily withstand judicial scrutiny. Indeed, this has been the ap-
proach and result in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits and in the District of 
Idaho.65 
What is less clear, however, is whether the rationality standard of 
Jones will continue to govern judicial evaluation of Thirteenth Amend-
ment legislation. In 1997, City of Boerne v. Flores altered the standard 
by which courts adjudge Fourteenth Amendment legislation, rejecting 
rationality review in favor of a more stringent approach that requires fed-
eral legislation to be congruent and proportional to judicially determined 
rights violations.66 In the Fifteenth Amendment context, the Supreme 
Court in Shelby County v. Holder held that the 2006 reauthorization of 
§ 4 of the Voting Rights Act was invalid because Congress failed to con-
sider “current conditions” with respect to voting discrimination and in-
stead relied on decades-old data and eradicated practices.67 Although the 
Shelby County Court declined to opine on whether City of Boerne’s con-
gruence and proportionality standard applies to Fifteenth Amendment 
legislation,68 the Court’s holding certainly indicates that the Court is will-
ing to critically assess the factual record that Congress compiles in pass-
ing voting rights laws. Although the Shelby County Court relied upon 
and did not overrule South Carolina v. Katzenbach—a 1966 case in 
which the Court upheld the original Voting Rights Act under rationality 
review—Shelby County, at the very least, makes it clear that this must be 
rationality review with bite. 
Whether Jones-style rationality review in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment context will remain valid is a topic of debate. Some defend its con-
tinued viability.69 Others, myself included, have argued that Jones is ob-
solete in light of City of Boerne and flawed as a matter of Thirteenth 
                                                 
 64. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24. 
 65. See Cannon, 750 F.3d at 492; United States v. Henery, No. 1:14–cr–00088–S–BLW, 2014 
WL 5222741 (D. Idaho Oct. 13, 2014); United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 67. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 68. This issue was briefed but not resolved. 
 69. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 63; Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40 (2012). 
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Amendment history and constitutional structure.70 At the very least, 
however, it is clear that Jones’s analytical framework stands in marked 
contrast to that endorsed by the Court in City of Boerne and Shelby 
County. 
Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod of the Fifth Circuit noted this dichot-
omy in a special concurrence in United States v. Cannon, a case chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Shepard-Byrd Act. Judge Elrod noted 
the “growing tension between the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding 
the scope of Congress’s powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions regarding the other Re-
construction Amendments and the Commerce Clause.”71 She raised par-
ticular concern about the scope of Congress’s factual findings for the 
Shepard-Byrd Act. Specifically, she noted that Congress’s findings fo-
cused on the historical link between slavery and racially motivated vio-
lence and that the legislative record developed in passing the Shepard-
Byrd Act lacked “any findings that current state laws, or the individuals 
charged with enforcing them, were failing to adequately protect victims 
from racially-motivated crimes.”72 Thus, in light of Shelby County, Judge 
Elrod questioned whether Congress should have made “findings regard-
ing ‘current needs’” before it chose to “impos[e] current burdens.”73 
Judge Elrod also noted the tension between City of Boerne and 
Jones.  In City of Boerne, the Court reasserted the judicial power of con-
stitutional interpretation and cautioned Congress against attempts to “de-
fine its own powers by altering” constitutional meaning.74 Jones, howev-
er, empowered Congress to define the concept of the badges and inci-
dents of slavery—what the Tenth Circuit recently characterized as the 
“power to define the meaning of the Constitution—a rare power in-
deed.”75 Judge Elrod expressed concern that under Jones, “it has indeed 
become difficult ‘to conceive of a principle that would limit congression-
al power.’”76 Ultimately, Judge Elrod stated that the lower federal courts 
                                                 
 70. See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1769 (2012); Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment Enforcement Power after City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77 (2010). 
 71. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 509 (5th Cir. 2014) (Elrod, J., specially concur-
ring). 
 72. Id. at 510. 
 73. Id. at 511 (quoting Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013)). 
 74. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
 75. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 76. Cannon, 750 F.3d at 511 (Elrod, J., specially concurring). 
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“would benefit from additional guidance from the Supreme Court on 
how to harmonize these lines of precedent.”77 
In light of City of Boerne, Shelby County and the judicial and 
scholarly attention regarding the scope of Congress’s power to enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment, it seems likely that challenges to the viability 
of the Shepard-Byrd Act will continue to percolate in the courts. 
III. WHY THE DIFFERENCE? 
At first glance it seems quite strange that a statute meant to protect 
racial minorities from violence has received greater Thirteenth Amend-
ment scrutiny than a statute meant to protect women and children from 
sex trafficking. Indeed, racial minorities were more clearly the intended 
beneficiaries of the Thirteenth Amendment than women and children. 
And racially motivated violence was unquestionably an integral feature 
of the institution of American chattel slavery. 
Why, then, is it that the TVPA has been immune from Thirteenth 
Amendment challenge while the Shepard-Byrd Act has not? One can 
hypothesize many factors that might explain this difference. Perhaps the 
issue of human trafficking has greater current political salience than that 
of hate crimes. Perhaps there is a federalism distinction because hate 
crimes are more thoroughly addressed by state law than human traffick-
ing. Perhaps hate crimes laws raise a greater range of other constitutional 
concerns than human trafficking laws do. Or perhaps the difference lies 
in the nature of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. Perhaps 
the TVPA is simply on sounder constitutional footing than the         
Shepard-Byrd Act. 
Whatever the case may be, the constitutional argument for the 
TVPA is simple: Human trafficking is modern-day slavery. A law that 
punishes and seeks redress for human trafficking is “appropriate legisla-
tion” under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment because it direct-
ly “enforce[s]” the substantive promise made in Section One; namely, 
that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the 
United States.”78 Given the factual findings Congress made in passing 
the TVPA,79 there is virtually no conceptual space between human traf-
ficking and either slavery or involuntary servitude. Thus, there is a direct 
correspondence between the subject of the TVPA—human trafficking—
                                                 
 77. Id. at 509. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 79. See supra Part A.1. 
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and subjects of the Thirteenth Amendment—slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude. 
The Shepard-Byrd Act, however, is prophylactic legislation, not di-
rect legislation like the TVPA. There is attenuation between the subject 
of the Act—racial hate crimes—and the subjects of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Thus, the constitutional argument for the Shepard-Byrd Act 
requires more steps and raises the question of whether Congress’s factual 
findings are sufficient to sustain the Act. 
To the extent that the Thirteenth Amendment requires only that 
Congress determine there to be a connection between an aspect of the 
historical slave system and a current societal problem—in other words, a 
link between past and present—the Act appears to be on solid footing. 
Racial violence was part and parcel of American chattel slavery. 
It may be, however, that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power requires not only a link to the past but also a link to the present. 
Specifically, it may require that Congress determine there to be a link 
between a current problem and an existing or incipient constitutional vio-
lation. Because only actual conditions of slavery or involuntary servitude 
violate Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress would have 
to find that racial hate crimes today are causing (or at least portending) 
the return of slavery or, perhaps, an entrenched system of second-class 
citizenship.80 While Congress did develop a record that supports the con-
clusion that racial hate crimes have detrimental societal effects, there is 
nothing in the record linking those effects to current conditions of slav-
ery or involuntary servitude. While racial hate crimes are undoubtedly 
insidious and destructive on both a personal and societal level, it is diffi-
cult to connect hate crimes with future slavery, particularly where      
forty-five states have their own hate crimes laws.81 The dearth of con-
gressional findings on this point is unsurprising but certainly notable, and 
may render the Shepard-Byrd Act susceptible to challenge. 
If the Supreme Court does decide to bring the standard for Thir-
teenth Amendment legislation into line with the standards announced and 
utilized in City of Boerne and Shelby County, it will have ramifications 
for the subjects that Congress will be able to address under that head of 
                                                 
 80. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 561, 626–27 (2012). 
 81. See Cannon, 750 F.3d at 512 (Elrod, J., specially concurring) (“[A]t least forty-five (45) 
states have criminal statutes that impose harsher penalties for crimes that are motivated by bi-
as . . . .”) (quoting defendant-appellant’s briefing) (citing Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime 
Provisions (Apr. 28, 2009)). 
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power. Legislation like the TVPA, which directly addresses current con-
stitutional violations and conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude 
will become the norm. Prophylactic legislation like the Shepard-Byrd 
Act will be increasingly hard to justify. While racial discrimination con-
tinues to be a problem in need of a remedy, Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power will be focused on directly ensuring free 
labor rather than addressing entrenched discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has not used its Thirteenth Amendment power lightly or 
with any great frequency despite the permissive framework for the Sec-
tion Two power developed in Jones. Yet, despite Jones, the constitution-
ality of one of the most recent Thirteenth Amendment enactments—the 
racial hate-crimes provision of the Shepard-Byrd Hate Crimes Act—has 
been challenged repeatedly. This history of litigation stands in stark con-
trast to the dearth of litigation surrounding the TVPA, Congress’s other 
modern piece of Thirteenth Amendment legislation. This disparity likely 
tells us something about the nature of the Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement power and suggests a future path for congressional initiatives 
under that head of power. 
